Equilibrium in behavior strategies in infinite extensive form games with imperfect information

DOI10.1007/BF01212472zbMath0808.90147MaRDI QIDQ1338096

Subir K. Chakrabarti

Publication date: 27 November 1994

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

existence of equilibriumextensive form gamesbehavior strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Discrete-time games (91A50)

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Cites Work

• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Limit games and limit equilibria
• On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information
• Dynamic games of innovation
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
• Representation and Approximation of Noncooperative Sequential Games
• Sequential Equilibria
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