Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
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Publication:1338121
DOI10.1007/BF01210572zbMath0808.90009OpenAlexW1974769140MaRDI QIDQ1338121
John H. Vande Vate, Alvin E. Roth
Publication date: 27 November 1994
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01210572
Related Items (25)
Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives ⋮ Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets ⋮ An analysis of the German university admissions system ⋮ Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests ⋮ Dynamically stable matching ⋮ On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods ⋮ Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand ⋮ Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare ⋮ Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts ⋮ Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching ⋮ Optimal truncation in matching markets ⋮ Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment ⋮ Random matching in the college admissions problem ⋮ Sticky matching in school choice ⋮ Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty ⋮ Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems ⋮ On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems ⋮ The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP) ⋮ In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm ⋮ Obvious manipulations ⋮ Marriage matching and gender satisfaction ⋮ Incentives in decentralized random matching markets ⋮ Protective behavior in matching models ⋮ Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
Cites Work
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Non-cooperative matching games
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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