A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1338544
DOI10.1007/BF00183303zbMath0812.90022OpenAlexW1971115531MaRDI QIDQ1338544
Publication date: 1 December 1994
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00183303
Related Items (8)
Electoral competition under costly policy implementation ⋮ Political competition between differentiated candidates ⋮ Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties ⋮ Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes ⋮ Parties with policy preferences and uncertainty over voter behavior ⋮ Political motivations and electoral competition: equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence ⋮ The binary policy model ⋮ Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
This page was built for publication: A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics
