Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining

DOI10.1006/game.1994.1042zbMath0809.90032OpenAlexW1969051198MaRDI QIDQ1338967

Peter B. Zemsky, Christopher N. Avery

Publication date: 28 March 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1042

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriummoney burningcomplete information Rubinstein bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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