An ``informationally robust equilibrium for two-person nonzero-sum games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1994.1047zbMath0809.90137OpenAlexW1993680043MaRDI QIDQ1338975

Arthur J. Robson

Publication date: 28 March 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/1154800/AR5620641.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

explicit slight uncertaintyinformational structureinformationally robust equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

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