Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information

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Publication:1338981

DOI10.1007/BF01212914zbMath0808.90023OpenAlexW4248729742MaRDI QIDQ1338981

Nicholas C. Yannelis, Leonidas C. Koutsougeras

Publication date: 27 November 1994

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212914




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