A coalition proof equilibrium for a private information credit economy

DOI10.1007/BF01212918zbMath0808.90024OpenAlexW3122921632MaRDI QIDQ1338987

Jeffrey M. Lacker, John A. Weinberg

Publication date: 27 November 1994

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212918

zbMATH Keywords

private informationcoalition proof Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (1)

Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Financial intermediary-coalitions
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Deriving strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria from an abstract system
• The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games
• The core of an economy with differential information
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information

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