Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments

DOI10.1007/BF01213695zbMath0811.90005MaRDI QIDQ1339005

Yoshikatsu Tatamitani

Publication date: 27 November 1994

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

social choice correspondences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents ⋮ Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems

Cites Work

• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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