Bounded rationality, neural network and folk theorem in repeated games with discounting

DOI10.1007/BF01213820zbMath0816.90144OpenAlexW1995150762MaRDI QIDQ1339026

In-Koo Cho

Publication date: 13 July 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213820

zbMATH Keywords

neural networksrepeated gamesdiscountingbounded rationalitytarget strategyperfect folk theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Neural networks for/in biological studies, artificial life and related topics (92B20) Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (7)

Bounded memory folk theorem ⋮ Bounded rationality and learning. Introduction ⋮ On the complexity of repeated principal agent games ⋮ The role of information processing cost as the foundation of bounded rationality in game theory ⋮ Cournot competition, organization and learning ⋮ Perceptron versus automaton in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Repeated games with one-memory

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Neural networks and physical systems with emergent collective computational abilities.
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players

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