On the efficiency of ex ante and ex post pricing institutions

DOI10.1007/BF01213254zbMath0808.90015MaRDI QIDQ1339032

Michael Peters

Publication date: 20 March 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

random matchingdecentralized matching modelpricing institutionssteady state equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Welfare analysis of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information

Cites Work

• Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
• Sequential bargaining and competition
• Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
• Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
• Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence
• Bargaining, Search Costs and Equilibrium Price Distributions
• Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States

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