Power indices for political and financial decision making: A review

DOI10.1007/BF02032761zbMath0812.90145MaRDI QIDQ1339206

Gianfranco Gambarelli

Publication date: 1 December 1994

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

weighted majority gamespower indicesshareholding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (10)

Control and voting power in corporate networks: Concepts and computational aspects ⋮ The value of composition games and (0,1) normalization games. I, II ⋮ Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota ⋮ On weights and quotas for weighted majority voting games ⋮ Takeover prices and portfolio theory ⋮ A decisiveness index for simple games ⋮ Convex linear generalization of random coalition games ⋮ Competition among parties and power: an empirical analysis ⋮ POWER INDICES AND THE MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL IN CORPORATE STRUCTURES ⋮ Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets

Cites Work

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• Common behaviour of power indices
• On the strong monotonicity of power indices
• Algorithm for automatic computation of the power variations in share tradings
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• ZS-value for random coalition games
• Indirect control of corporations
• A new value for games without transferable utilities
• A new approach for evaluating the Shapely value
• Arbitraggi bilanciati per giochi omogenei di maggioranza ponderata
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Characterization of the Banzhaf–Coleman Index

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