Exact implementation

DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1051zbMath0830.90003OpenAlexW4244669389MaRDI QIDQ1339736

Dilip Abreu, Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 8 December 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1051

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmechanismssocial choice functioniterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (24)

Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information ⋮ Implementing coordinated team play ⋮ Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms ⋮ Continuous virtual implementation: complete information ⋮ Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima ⋮ Behavioral aspects of implementation theory ⋮ Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences ⋮ Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments ⋮ Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge ⋮ Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies ⋮ Full implementation in backward induction ⋮ Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions ⋮ Nash implementation without no-veto power ⋮ Role of honesty in full implementation ⋮ Comprehensive rationalizability ⋮ Rationalizable implementation ⋮ Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences ⋮ Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences ⋮ Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability ⋮ Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms ⋮ Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information ⋮ Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners

This page was built for publication: Exact implementation