Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1054zbMath0820.90130OpenAlexW3122124571MaRDI QIDQ1339739

Andreas Blume

Publication date: 8 December 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1054

zbMATH Keywords

sender-receiver gamesbabbling equilibriaeffectiveness of perturbation refinementspooling equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (6)

Nash blocks ⋮ A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk ⋮ A note on pre-play communication ⋮ Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria ⋮ MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES ⋮ Signaling Games

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