Sequential equilibria and stable sets of beliefs

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1055zbMath0824.90141OpenAlexW1985261447MaRDI QIDQ1339740

John Hillas

Publication date: 8 December 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1055

zbMATH Keywords

sequential equilibriastable set of beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (5)

Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs ⋮ Market signaling with grades ⋮ Limited focus in dynamic games ⋮ Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm ⋮ Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning

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