Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms

DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1058zbMath0824.90010OpenAlexW2060245258MaRDI QIDQ1339743

Arunava Sen, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 8 December 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1058

zbMATH Keywords

social choice functionBayesian-Nash equilibriuminfinite number of messages

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation ⋮ Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments ⋮ Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection

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