The burden of proof in a game of persuasion

DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1066zbMath0811.90136OpenAlexW2080223316MaRDI QIDQ1339751

Hyun Song Shin

Publication date: 8 December 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1066

zbMATH Keywords

decision rulearbitrator

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (27)

Hard evidence and mechanism design ⋮ Persuasion and dynamic communication ⋮ To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals ⋮ On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games ⋮ Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty. ⋮ Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission ⋮ The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders ⋮ How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence ⋮ Expert panels with selective investigation ⋮ Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion ⋮ Strategic argumentation ⋮ Implementation with partial provability ⋮ A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions ⋮ Mixed up? That's good for motivation ⋮ Long persuasion games ⋮ Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion ⋮ EFFECTIVE PERSUASION ⋮ Evidence disclosure and verifiability ⋮ Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games ⋮ Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules. ⋮ Balance of opinions in expert panels ⋮ Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences ⋮ Simple versus rich language in disclosure games ⋮ Information transmission and voting ⋮ Strategic communication with reporting costs ⋮ Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types

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