A foundation for Pareto aggregation

DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1068zbMath0866.90008OpenAlexW1970306654MaRDI QIDQ1339753

Donald E. Campbell, Ryo-Ichi Nagahisa

Publication date: 8 December 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1068

zbMATH Keywords

social welfare functionArrow's independence axiom

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

A foundation for Pareto optimality ⋮ An oligarchy theorem in fixed agenda without Pareto conditions ⋮ Characterization of Pareto dominance

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