On informational efficiency and incentive aspects of generalized ratio equilibria

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)90017-5zbMath0822.90008OpenAlexW2083033716MaRDI QIDQ1340080

Guoqiang Tian

Publication date: 9 February 1995

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90017-5

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesmechanism designinformational efficiencypublic goods economiesgeneralized ratio equilibriumminimal message spacePareto efficient resource allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Economics of information (91B44) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production

Cites Work

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• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods

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