The optimistic stability of the core of mixed markets

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)90020-5zbMath0828.90013OpenAlexW2050600761MaRDI QIDQ1340083

Joseph Greenberg, Benyamin Shitovitz

Publication date: 8 January 1996

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90020-5

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitystable setcorecompetitive equilibriummixed markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items

Stability of the core mapping in games with a countable set of players ⋮ The graph of Lindahl correspondence as the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern abstract stable set ⋮ Strict fairness of equilibria in asymmetric information economies and mixed markets ⋮ Fairness and formation rules of coalitions ⋮ Equilibrium in a mixed economy of Arrow-Debreu type ⋮ Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets

Cites Work

• Credible coalitions and the core
• Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
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