The equilibrium allocation of investment capital in the presence of adverse selection and costly state verification

DOI10.1007/BF01209695zbMath0820.90002OpenAlexW2017184967MaRDI QIDQ1341443

John H. Boyd, Bruce D. Smith

Publication date: 5 January 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01209695

zbMATH Keywords

credit rationingequilibrium allocation of investment capital

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (4)

Optimal multilateral contracts ⋮ Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models ⋮ Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary ⋮ A model of collateral, investment, and adverse selection

Cites Work

• Financial intermediary-coalitions
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary
• Demand deposit contracts, suspension of convertibility, and optimal financial intermediation
• Optimal multilateral contracts
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem

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