On the continuity of expected utility

DOI10.1007/BF01210263zbMath0820.90029MaRDI QIDQ1341462

Erik J. Balder, Nicholas C. Yannelis

Publication date: 5 January 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

necessary and sufficient conditionsexpected utilityprincipal-agent problemscooperative solution conceptsgames with differential information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (14)

Existence of solutions to principal-agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions ⋮ Existence of equilibrium in Bayesian games with infinitely many players ⋮ Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information ⋮ New conditions for the existence of Radner equilibrium with infinitely many states ⋮ Equilibrium existence in games with a concave Bayesian potential ⋮ Catalog competition and stable nonlinear prices ⋮ Alpha cores of games with nonatomic asymmetric information ⋮ A theorem of the maximin and applications to Bayesian zero-sum games ⋮ Existence of Nash equilibria in large games ⋮ Debreu's social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents ⋮ Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and infinitely many states ⋮ Existence of equilibrium with nonconvexities and finitely many agents ⋮ Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information ⋮ Value allocation under ambiguity

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• On Lower Semicontinuity of Integral Functionals. I
• The Core of an N Person Game

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