An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money

DOI10.1007/BF01211117zbMath0815.90049OpenAlexW2006561906MaRDI QIDQ1341475

V. Pereyra

Publication date: 5 January 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01211117

zbMATH Keywords

ordinal rankingefficient allocationsVickrey and English auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money ⋮ Scheduling with package auctions ⋮ Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study ⋮ Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment ⋮ School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms ⋮ School choice: an experimental study

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money
• A study to zero-out auctions: Testbed experiments of a process of allocating private rights to the use of public property
• Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money