Sequential selling mechanisms

DOI10.1007/BF01221202zbMath0813.90026MaRDI QIDQ1341487

Carl Ehrman, Michael Peters

Publication date: 29 May 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

bilateral communicationmultilateral communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation ⋮ Auction design with costly preference elicitation

Cites Work

• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Dynamic programming and stochastic control
• Search mechanisms
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers

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