Measuring the instability in two-sided matching procedures

DOI10.1007/BF01213624zbMath0819.90078OpenAlexW2052623649MaRDI QIDQ1341512

Raymond Board

Publication date: 5 January 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213624

zbMATH Keywords

two-sided matchingstable marriage model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70)

Cites Work

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• On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem
• The Average Number of Stable Matchings
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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