Type correlated equilibria for games with payoff uncertainty

DOI10.1007/BF01213628zbMath0815.90141MaRDI QIDQ1341517

Kevin D. Cotter

Publication date: 5 January 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumpayoff uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (4)

Random-player games ⋮ Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games ⋮ A theorem of the maximin and applications to Bayesian zero-sum games ⋮ Information, measurability, and continuous behavior.

Cites Work

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• Similarity of information and behavior with a pointwise convergence topology
• Similarity of games with incomplete information
• Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Private Information and Pure-Strategy Equilibria
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Equiconvergence of Martingales

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