A challenge to the compound lottery axiom: A two-stage normative structure and comparison to other theories
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Publication:1342393
DOI10.1007/BF01079912zbMath0839.90001WikidataQ114018479 ScholiaQ114018479MaRDI QIDQ1342393
M.-Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, Donald B. Davis
Publication date: 23 June 1996
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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