Finitely many players with bounded recall in infinitely repeated games

DOI10.1006/game.1994.1058zbMath0819.90139OpenAlexW1981735258MaRDI QIDQ1342403

Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 11 January 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1058

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium payoffsbounded recallset of limit points\(n\)-player repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Bounded memory folk theorem ⋮ Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring ⋮ Repeated games with bounded entropy ⋮ Playing off-line games with bounded rationality ⋮ Computer science and decision theory ⋮ Repeated games with one-memory ⋮ Strategic entropy and complexity in repeated games ⋮ Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality ⋮ How to play with a biased coin?