Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
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Publication:1342416
DOI10.1006/jeth.1994.1079zbMath0871.90009OpenAlexW1490406382MaRDI QIDQ1342416
Louis Makowski, Claudio Mezzetti
Publication date: 16 February 1995
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1079
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