Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(94)90005-1zbMath0815.90008OpenAlexW1986638228MaRDI QIDQ1342676

Georges Dionne, Pascale Viala

Publication date: 27 June 1995

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)90005-1

zbMATH Keywords

renegotiation of financial contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (2)

Debt, moral hazard and airline safety: An empirical evidence ⋮ Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity

Cites Work

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

This page was built for publication: Moral hazard, renegotiation and debt