Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
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Publication:1347821
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2782zbMath1034.91026OpenAlexW2075544144MaRDI QIDQ1347821
Arunava Sen, Bhaskar Dutta, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2782
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