A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
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Publication:1350573
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(96)00805-1zbMath0875.90014OpenAlexW2061099968MaRDI QIDQ1350573
Publication date: 27 February 1997
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(96)00805-1
Related Items (16)
Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem ⋮ Games of manipulation in marriage problems ⋮ Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Dynamically stable matching ⋮ Matching markets under (in)complete information ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Profit-maximizing matchmaker ⋮ Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets ⋮ Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems. ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems ⋮ The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation ⋮ Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results ⋮ The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets ⋮ Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
Cites Work
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- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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