Finite automata play repeated prisoner's dilemma with information processing costs

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(94)00848-1zbMath0875.90347OpenAlexW1981113510MaRDI QIDQ1350653

Teck-Hua Ho

Publication date: 27 February 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)00848-1

zbMATH Keywords

Genetic algorithmLearningComputational complexityPrisoner's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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