Finite automata play repeated prisoner's dilemma with information processing costs
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Publication:1350653
DOI10.1016/0165-1889(94)00848-1zbMath0875.90347OpenAlexW1981113510MaRDI QIDQ1350653
Publication date: 27 February 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)00848-1
Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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