Efficiency of dynamic quantity competition: A remark on Markovian equilibria

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(95)00753-9zbMath0875.90271OpenAlexW2166480159MaRDI QIDQ1351740

David Sevy, Rim Lahmandi-Ayed, Jean Pierre Ponssard

Publication date: 27 February 1997

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(95)00753-9

zbMATH Keywords

EfficiencyMarkov equilibriaDynamic oligopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF NATURAL DUOPOLY ⋮ EFFICIENCY IN DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF QUANTITY COMPETITION ⋮ Selection in dynamic entry games

Cites Work

• Forward induction and sunk costs give average cost pricing
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
• Multiperiod Decision Models with Alternating Choice as a Solution to the Duopoly Problem
• Unnamed Item

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