Incentive contracting with hidden choices of effort and risk

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(94)00570-RzbMath0875.90234OpenAlexW2128015093MaRDI QIDQ1352163

Liang Zou

Publication date: 27 February 1997

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)00570-r

zbMATH Keywords

riskeffortagency model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I

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