Impossibility of deception in a conflict among subjects with interdependent preference
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Publication:1354187
DOI10.1016/S0096-3003(96)00018-5zbMath0907.92034MaRDI QIDQ1354187
Bunpei Nakano, Shingo Takahashi, Takehiro Inohara
Publication date: 23 June 1997
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) History, political science (91F10) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)
Related Items (6)
On conditions for a meeting not to reach a deadlock ⋮ Complete stability and inside commonality of perceptions ⋮ Relational Nash equilibrium and interrelationships among relational and rational equilibrium concepts ⋮ Credibility of information in ``soft games with interperception of emotions. ⋮ Strength of preference in graph models for multiple-decision-maker conflicts ⋮ On consistent coalitions in group decision making with flexible decision makers.
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