Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems
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Publication:1357208
DOI10.1007/BF01262509zbMath0872.90119OpenAlexW2268532629MaRDI QIDQ1357208
Publication date: 16 June 1997
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01262509
\(n\)-creditor bankruptcy rulebilateral principle of justicequasi-transitivity of the binary relations
Related Items (21)
A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel ⋮ A noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules ⋮ Equal sacrifice taxation ⋮ Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks ⋮ The two-agent claims-truncated proportional rule has no consistent extension: a constructive proof ⋮ Consistent cost sharing ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey. ⋮ Random conjugates of bankruptcy rules ⋮ Equal Area Rule to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims ⋮ A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims ⋮ Allocation rules on networks ⋮ On the existence of consistent rules to adjudicate conflicting claims: a constructive geometric approach ⋮ On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency ⋮ Flow sharing and bankruptcy games ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the CEA solution for rationing problems ⋮ Allocation problems among sharing groups ⋮ Consistency and its converse: an introduction ⋮ GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY AND TAXATION PROBLEMS: RECENT ADVANCES ⋮ `Hydraulic' rationing ⋮ Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update ⋮ Parametric rationing methods
Cites Work
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- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- On the reduced game property and its converse
- Distributive justice in taxation
- The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative bargaining approach
- Consistent extensions
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
- Stability and Collective Rationality
- On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
- Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions
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