Stability of the core mapping in games with a countable set of players

DOI10.1007/BF01262511zbMath0872.90120MaRDI QIDQ1357210

Ezra Einy, Benyamin Shitovitz

Publication date: 15 October 1997

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

dominance relationcore of a subgamecountable set of players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (2)

Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets ⋮ General systems and \(\varphi\)-stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments

Cites Work

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• Convex games and extreme points
• The optimistic stability of the core of mixed markets
• The optimistic stability of the core mapping in public goods production economies
• Core and stable sets of large games arising in economics
• Countably additive measures in cores of games
• Cores of convex games
• Cores of exact games. I
• Convex games and stable sets
• Credible coalitions and the core
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders

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