The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games

DOI10.1007/BF01262513zbMath0871.90115OpenAlexW3123269549MaRDI QIDQ1357213

Javier Arin, Vincent Feltkamp

Publication date: 16 June 1997

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01262513

zbMATH Keywords

nucleolus of arbitrary transferable utility gamesveto-rich games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-08)

Related Items (15)

Monotonicity properties of the nucleolus on the domain of veto balanced games ⋮ Coalitional games with veto players: consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes ⋮ Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core ⋮ Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies ⋮ Peer group situations and games with fuzzy uncertainty ⋮ A polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus for a class of disjunctive games with a permission structure ⋮ RESTRICTED COALITIONS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF REGIONAL FISHERIES ORGANIZATIONS ⋮ A bargaining procedure leading to the serial rule in games with veto players ⋮ On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions ⋮ COLLECTING INFORMATION TO IMPROVE DECISION-MAKING ⋮ On 1-convexity and nucleolus of co-insurance games ⋮ Average monotonic cooperative games ⋮ An algorithm for computing the nucleolus of disjunctive non-negative additive games with an acyclic permission structure ⋮ A characterization of the nucleolus for convex games ⋮ The Complexity of the Nucleolus in Compact Games

Cites Work

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• Information market games
• Auctioning Böhm-Bawerk's horses
• On the core of routing games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• On the Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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