On an axiomatization of the Banzhaf value without the additivity axiom

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Publication:1357219

DOI10.1007/BF01262517zbMath0871.90122OpenAlexW4248321094WikidataQ114018454 ScholiaQ114018454MaRDI QIDQ1357219

Andrzej S. Nowak

Publication date: 16 June 1997

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01262517




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