Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0520zbMath0871.90137OpenAlexW2054203706MaRDI QIDQ1357399

Jonathan P. Thomas, Martin W. Cripps

Publication date: 10 June 1997

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/16385/1/16385.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

one-sided incomplete informationrepeated common interest games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (9)

Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device ⋮ (Bad) reputation in relational contracting ⋮ Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts ⋮ Reputation Effects ⋮ Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests ⋮ Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players ⋮ Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information

Cites Work

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• Cooperation and bounded recall
• A characterization of sequential equilibrium strategies in infinitely repeated incomplete information games
• Bayesian learning in repeated games
• Reputation in perturbed repeated games
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests

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