An optimal auction for complements

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0534zbMath0871.90022OpenAlexW1966404657MaRDI QIDQ1357402

Jonathan Levin

Publication date: 10 June 1997

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/7bb0611ddda67936331a4bce59fdae9e5b38e396

zbMATH Keywords

optimal auction allocationoptimal selling mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments ⋮ Optimal combinatorial mechanism design ⋮ Sequential versus bundle auctions for recurring procurement ⋮ Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information ⋮ Implementation in an interdependent value framework ⋮ Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers ⋮ Optimal mechanisms with simple menus ⋮ On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction ⋮ Automated Design of Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A multiple-object auction with superadditive values
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• Simultaneous auctions with synergies
• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Optimal Auction Design
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing

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