How proper is sequential equilibrium?
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Publication:1357403
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0518zbMath0873.90119OpenAlexW2240839840MaRDI QIDQ1357403
Larry Samuelson, Jeroen M. Swinkels, George J. Mailath
Publication date: 10 June 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1161.pdf
lexicographic probability systemsproper equilibriumstrategic independence respecting equilibriumstrategy profile of a normal form game
Related Items (6)
Lexicographic beliefs and assumption ⋮ How proper is sequential equilibrium? ⋮ Lexicographic probabilities and robustness ⋮ Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium ⋮ Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation ⋮ Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
Cites Work
- A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
- Normal form structures in extensive form games
- How proper is sequential equilibrium?
- Order independence for iterated weak dominance
- Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
- Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
- Multistage Games with Communication
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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