Learning to learn, pattern recognition, and Nash equilibrium
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Publication:1357407
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0532zbMath0871.90112OpenAlexW2088924845MaRDI QIDQ1357407
Publication date: 10 June 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1ae36b7ca59258bcacf16875ea9adebe5b1dc8fa
Related Items (7)
Exploitable actions of believers in the ``law of small numbers in repeated constant-sum games ⋮ Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game ⋮ Strategic pattern recognition -- experimental evidence. ⋮ Beyond fictitious play beliefs: incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching ⋮ Evidence for learning to learn behavior in normal form games ⋮ Conditional universal consistency. ⋮ The role of absolute continuity in merging of opinions and rational learning
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- Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
- Subjective games and equilibria
- Fictitious play property for games with identical interests
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
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