Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1357419
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2229zbMath0886.90193OpenAlexW2027158077MaRDI QIDQ1357419
Publication date: 10 June 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/23a49b991ea8265b3b86bf0664cfb78643acf057
Related Items
The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance ⋮ Universality of the Epstein-Wang type structure ⋮ Rationalizability in general situations ⋮ Games with second-order expected utility ⋮ Choice structures in games ⋮ Possibilistic beliefs in strategic games ⋮ Ambiguous act equilibria ⋮ ``Agreeing to disagree type results: a decision-theoretic approach. ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences ⋮ Possibility and permissibility ⋮ Granny versus game theorist: Ambiguity in experimental games ⋮ Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs ⋮ Epistemic conditions for agreement and stochastic independence of \(\epsilon\)-contaminated beliefs ⋮ Ellsberg games ⋮ Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents ⋮ Choquet rationality ⋮ Iterated strict dominance in general games ⋮ Game-theoretic modeling of players' ambiguities on external factors ⋮ On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules ⋮ Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information ⋮ Games in context: equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions ⋮ Theories of coalitional rationality ⋮ Correlated Nash equilibrium ⋮ Ambiguous games ⋮ Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players ⋮ Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences
- Agreeing to disagree
- Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty: Breaking down backward induction
- Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Nash equilibrium without mutual knowledge of rationality
- Strategic rationality orderings and the best rationalization principle
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
- A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability
- Pure Strategy Dominance
- Equivalence in nonlinear programming
- "Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities
- A Definition of Subjective Probability
