Public goods provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin mechanism for restricted agent characteristics

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2232zbMath0879.90059OpenAlexW2032610729MaRDI QIDQ1357589

Parimal Kanti Bag

Publication date: 10 June 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2232

zbMATH Keywords

two-stage gamepublic goods provision problemsocially efficient outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (5)

Sharing sequential values in a network ⋮ An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities ⋮ Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule ⋮ Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities ⋮ The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games

Cites Work

• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions

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