Approximate common knowledge and co-ordination: Recent lessons from game theory

DOI10.1023/A:1008270519000zbMath0877.68105OpenAlexW1482122166MaRDI QIDQ1357673

O. Diekmann

Publication date: 27 November 1997

Published in: Journal of Logic, Language and Information (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1008270519000

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycommon knowledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27)

Related Items (10)

Common Knowledge, Common Attitudes and Social Reasoning ⋮ THE E-MAIL GAME REVISITED — MODELING ROUGH INDUCTIVE REASONING ⋮ Being realistic about common knowledge: a lewisian approach ⋮ Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations ⋮ The fragility of common knowledge ⋮ On the logical unsolvability of the Gettier problem ⋮ Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication ⋮ Efficiency and equilibrium in the electronic mail game; the general case ⋮ Common knowledge revisited ⋮ Non-cooperative computation: Boolean functions with correctness and exclusivity

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