Correlated equilibrium and potential games

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Publication:1358635

DOI10.1007/BF01295851zbMath0881.90137OpenAlexW3121877238MaRDI QIDQ1358635

Abraham Neyman

Publication date: 3 July 1997

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01295851




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