A cooperative analysis of covert collusion in oligopolistic industries

DOI10.1007/BF01295854zbMath0881.90025OpenAlexW3123995085MaRDI QIDQ1358638

Jingang Zhao

Publication date: 3 July 1997

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01295854

zbMATH Keywords

existence resultsoligopoly marketsAlpha-core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (4)

Spectral decomposition of score functions in linkage analysis ⋮ Strong coalitional equilibria in games under uncertainty ⋮ A \(\beta\)-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets ⋮ Oligopolistic markets with leadership, cooperative followers and a multivalued inverse demand function

Cites Work

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• Game theoretic modeling of increasing returns to scale
• A theorem on open coverings of a simplex and Scarf's core existence theorem through Brouwer's fixed point theorem
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• The Core of an N Person Game

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