An experimental study of time-independent and time-dependent externalities in the commons

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0541zbMath0872.90129OpenAlexW2039118124MaRDI QIDQ1359008

Andrew Herr, James M. Walker, R. J. Gardner

Publication date: 24 June 1997

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0541

zbMATH Keywords

common-pool resourcesexperimental study

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (2)

Binding contracts, non-binding promises and social feedback in the intertemporal common-pool resource game ⋮ A Review of Experiments on Dynamic Games in Environmental and Resource Economics

Cites Work

• “STRAGEDY” OF THE COMMONS
• Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games

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