Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0549zbMath0872.90127OpenAlexW2027953754MaRDI QIDQ1359010

Harborne W. jun. Stuart

Publication date: 24 June 1997

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0549

zbMATH Keywords

rationalitycommon belieffinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium, Conservative belief and rationality, The context of the game, Self-admissible sets, A note on mutually absolutely continuous belief systems, Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information, On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points